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Introduction 
The global trade union federation Building and Wood Workers’ International (BWI) raised a specific 
instance with the Swiss National Contact Point (NCP) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) concerning human rights violations of migrant workers related to the 
construction of facilities for the 2022 World Cup of the Fédération Internationale de Football 
Association (FIFA). BWI raised nine issues. These included a due diligence policy for FIFA to commit to 
the ILO Core Conventions and the UN Guiding Principles of Business and Human Rights and the OECD 
Guidelines as part of the criteria for bids by countries wishing to host the FIFA World Cup. They also 
included a human rights impact assessment and use of FIFA’s considerable leverage to engage with 
the Qatari government to accelerate labor and human rights related reforms, especially the 
abolishment of the Kafala system. In its responding statement, FIFA first questioned whether the OECD 
Guidelines even apply to it, given that it is an association rather than a business. Regarding its leverage 
over the Qatari government, FIFA indicated that its direct counterparty is not the Qatari government 
but instead the member association, the Qatar Football Association. Regarding labor standards, FIFA 
follows International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 26000 guidance for social responsibility 
and ISO 20121 standards for event sustainability management systems. Sustainability reporting 
adheres to Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) guidelines and stakeholder engagement is based on 
AA1000 Stakeholder Engagement Standard. More specifically, FIFA indicates that its Quality 
Programme includes ethical business practices in terms of child labor, working hours, health and safety 
requirements, which are based on the code of conduct of the World Federation of the Sporting Goods 
Industry (WFSGI). Last, FIFA states that future biddings will follow the United Nations Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGP). 
Having established the identity and interest of the parties and its own competence, the NCP addressed 
the issue whether the OECD Guidelines are applicable to FIFA. First the NCP reiterated the broad 
definition of multinational enterprise cited in the OECD Guidelines, a definition that includes 
enterprises in all sectors of the economy; permits private, state, or mixed ownership; and usually 
involves companies or entities established in other countries. Further, the NCP asserted that the 
Guidelines expressly establish principles and standards for responsible business conduct, which is 
generally understood as the responsibility of entities involved in business or commercial activities. 
Whether an entity can be considered to have commercial activities is to be determined by the 
competent NCP on a case-by-case analysis based on the circumstances. To understand the FIFA 
context, the NCP’s next step was therefore first to ascertain its legal structure. FIFA is not a single legal 
entity, but comprises several, which are listed in the Commercial Register of the Canton of Zurich. FIFA 
also owns a number of foreign subsidiaries. The second consideration relates to the sort of activities 
FIFA undertakes. For this determination, the NCP analyzed the bidding contract between FIFA and its 
direct counterparties in Qatar. The contract is comprehensive and includes various commercial 
elements, among them media marketing rights, finance, and insurance. The NCP’s conclusion is 
therefore that the OECD Guidelines are applicable, for three reasons: FIFA includes different entities 
active in more than one country, has a multinational scope, and undertakes commercial activities. 
Having established that the OECD Guidelines are applicable, the NCP can offer its function as mediator 
to deal with the merits of the specific instance, that is, decent and safe working conditions for migrant 
workers involved with building stadiums and related facilities and infrastructure for the 2022 World 
Cup. Under auspicious of the Swiss NCP, BWI and FIFA reached agreement on five areas identified as 
relevant: first, identification and use of FIFA’s leverage on relevant actors in Qatar; secon, the human 
rights policy invoked the new Article 3 of the FIFA Statutes; third, a robust process of monitoring labor 
conditions; fourth, mechanisms for worker complaints and grievances; and, fifth, establishment of an 
oversight-advisory body. BWI and FIFA concurred on the need for continued regular dialogue between 
them. They also agreed to meet again with the Swiss NCP nine months after the publication of the 
final statement.  
The Kafala System 
FIFA’s decision to grant the 2022 World Cup to Qatar has been met with much disapproval worldwide 
by various organizations, including human and labor rights entities. Some of the disapproval relates to 
scandals concerning corruption within FIFA.1 Some is linked to the Kafala system. Kafala, which means 
sponsorship in Arabic, is a system of control. In the context of migrant workers in Arabic countries, 
Qatar among them, it is a system in which governments have delegated oversight and responsibility 
for migrant workers to private citizens and companies.2 Sponsors are granted legal powers to control 
migrant workers; for example, a worker cannot change his job, quite his job, or leave the country 
without the employer’s permission. Further, an employer has the authority to cancel the residence 
visa of a worker who quit his or her job without permission. In doing so, such a worker immediately 
becomes an illegal resident in the country, often providing cause for deportation proceedings, which 
can include prison time.  
The advocacy organization Migrant-Rights.org argues that Kafala is more a matter of security rather 
than a labor issue. To a certain extent, this is understandable given that the population of migrant 
workers in Qatar is often higher than that of than inhabitants. In the run-up to the World Cup, for 
example, it is estimated at 94 percent.3 In this context, it has been argued that leaving the Kafala 
system might disrupt Qatari society too much. A fear among the Qatari is that under a less strict 
regime, migrant workers would unite, coalesce, and perhaps even mobilize against them.4 That the 
Kafala system puts migrant workers in a particularly vulnerable position is to a certain extent therefore 
with intent. The vulnerability is evident in many aspects of work. One is an initial payment of about 
$3,000 to the recruitment agency. The idea is that this amount can easily be repaid with the better 
wages the worker will receive. Unfortunately, reassignment to another job that pays considerably less 
is common among migrant workers. In addition, migrant workers are often required to work long 
hours but get no time off. Moreover, health and safety is even more an issue and in jeopardy when it 
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comes to the construction of the stadiums, roads, and other buildings needed for the World Cup, 
because the statutory breaks imposed during summer midday hours are not adequate protection.5  
In these circumstances, the Kafala system is especially harmful to migrant workers. First, they are not 
allowed to organize, which deprives them of the ability to change their working conditions and 
improve the health and safety at construction sites. Second, they cannot leave their employment, 
mainly because their passports are typically confiscated, but also because of their debt to the 
recruitment agency. In addition are the risks of imprisonment for leaving their sponsor without 
authorization and of immediate deportation.6 Statistical data indicate that the 2022 World Cup is 
already the most deadly of all such events: 1,200 deaths are associated with Qatar construction sites. 
The sixty fatal accidents at the 2014 Olympic Games in Sochi were already extreme relative to  ten for 
the 2014 World Cup in Brazil, two for the 2010 World Cup in South Africa, and one for the 2012 
Olympics in London.7 How many workers really died due to poor working conditions at the 
constructions sides is unclear, partly because it is very difficult to get this information and the 
information that is gathered is distorted. Many of the deaths are not investigated, for example, often 
because they are attributed to natural causes, such as cardiac arrest or respiratory failure, rather than 
the actual dehydration or heat stress.8 
 
Actions to change the working circumstances in Qatar 
The specific instance BWI initiated with the Swiss NCP is one of many to pressure the Qatari 
government to abolish the Kafala system. The Dutch trade union FNV, for example, together with two 
other trade unions and a migrant worker from Bangladesh also initiated a case against FIFA. The claim 
was similar to this specific instance, namely, that FIFA should fulfil its responsibility to ensure better 
working circumstances for the migrant workers at World Cup construction sites. On 6 January 2016, 
the Swiss court rejected the claim of FNV on the grounds that FIFA was doing enough.9 International 
organizations like the ILO,10 nongovernmental organizations such as Human Rights Watch11 and 
Amnesty International,12 and the (international) press are also pressuring Qatar. With the exception 
of the FNV case, however, these initiatives are all forms of soft law or soft jurisprudence.13 They do, 
however, demonstrate the importance of trade unions and the ability to organize transnationally and 
initiate actions based on transnational solidarity. It is because of their efforts and actions that these 
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soft law initiatives, if slowly, seem to pay off in hard reforms. First, in May 2017 FIFA adopted a Human 
Rights Policy based on the United Nations Global Compact principles and the Ruggie Framework, 
which covers activities in countries hosting World Cups.14 Second, Qatar has vowed to adopt changes 
in the Kafala system to make it less susceptible to practices that amount to modern slavery.15 Although 
the future will reveal how serious these promises are, the first steps have been taken and there is no 
retracing them. If the reforms prove to be serious and are followed up by others, the 2022 World Cup 
will bring the world more than just a great sports event. It will make Qatar, Qatar World Cup 
construction sites, and future World Cup construction sites a safer and healthier work place for 
workers, migrant and domestic.  
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